The CFPB\u27s Ambiguous  Abusive  Standard by Roquemore, Joshua L.
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 22 | Issue 1 Article 12
3-1-2018
The CFPB's Ambiguous "Abusive" Standard
Joshua L. Roquemore
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




The CFPB’s Ambiguous “Abusive” Standard 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A cloud of uncertainty rests over the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), and this uncertainty extends to more than 
just the future existence of the agency.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) was enacted in 
2010, bringing with it an abundance of financial regulation and reform.1  
Dodd-Frank also created the CFPB and granted to it the power to 
“regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or 
services under the Federal consumer financial laws.”2  This mandate 
includes the authority to protect consumers from “unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts or practices” (collectively “UDAAP”).3  The Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) traditionally had the authority to prevent and 
punish unfair and deceptive behavior, and as a result there is already a 
fairly well-established body of law on those two legal standards.4  The 
abusive standard, on the other hand, has lacked statutory, judicial, and 
administrative clarity since its inception.5  Until recently, the CFPB had 
never brought an action alleging solely abusive behavior, as the agency 
typically includes a claim of abuse with a claim of deception or 
unfairness.6  However, the cloud may finally be lifting, as the CFPB 
recently brought two administrative proceedings based solely on 
allegations of abusive behavior.7  These cases present the only stand-
alone abuse claims, and their analysis reveals a great deal of ambiguity 
surrounding the CFPB’s definition and application of the “abusive” 
 
 1. Infra notes 2–4. 
 2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1101, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2016). 
 3. Dodd-Frank § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2016) (defining “unfair” and “deceptive” acts and practices, and 
providing examples of behavior that qualifies as such). 
 5. See infra Part II.C. 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
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standard.8  Ultimately, the CFPB should further define the standard in 
order to provide consumers and financial institutions with clarity and 
stability.9 
This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II briefly outlines the 
statutory framework of the CFPB’s authority, focusing on the ambiguity 
surrounding the abusive standard and discussing support for and criticism 
of the standard.10  Part III discusses CFPB v. Aequitas Capital 
Management, Inc., and the Zero Parallel proceeding, which represent the 
only two occasions the CFPB has brought a stand-alone abuse claim.11  
Part IV discusses CFPB v. Navient Corporation, and the Flurish 
proceeding, in order to determine whether the abuse claims were truly 
necessary in Aequitas and Zero Parallel.12  Finally, Part V concludes by 
analyzing the problems with the abusive standard, providing specific 
recommendations for the CFPB and financial institutions moving 
forward.13 
II. “ABUSIVE” ACTS OR PRACTICES UNDER DODD-FRANK 
A. Legislative Framework 
As previously mentioned, the CFPB inherited the unfair and 
deceptive legal standards from the FTC,14 and was granted the power to 
regulate abusive acts or practices under Dodd-Frank.15  While the unfair 
and deceptive standards were defined by the FTC in cases spanning 
several decades, the CFPB was given a clean slate with respect to the 
abusive standard.16  In fact, the statutory language provides the only 
 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
 14. See Consumer Finance Monitor, How the CFPB and the FTC Interact (Part 1), 
BALLARD SPAHR, LLC (Jul. 7, 2011), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2011/07/ 
07/how-the-cfpb-and-the-ftc-interact-part-i/ (describing how the Dodd-Frank Act allocates 
responsibilities between the two agencies). 
 15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §§ 
1021, 1031, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511(b)(2), 5531(a) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 16. See Patrick M. Corrigan, Abusive Acts and Practices: Dodd-Frank’s Behaviorally 
Informed Authority Over Consumer Credit Markets and Its Application to Teaser Rates, 18 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 128–29 (2015) (describing the history of the unfair and 
deceptive prongs as they relate to the FTC and CFPB); see How Will the CFPB Function 
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official guidance with respect to the abusive standard.  Dodd-Frank 
defines as abusive any act or practice that: 
  
(1) [M]aterially interferes with the ability of a consumer 
to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial 
product or service; or (2) takes unreasonable advantage 
of (A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer 
of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or 
service; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the 
interests of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer 
financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable 
reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the 
interests of the consumer.17 
   
Similarly, the categorization of “unfair” applies to any conduct 
where: (1) “the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers;” 
and (2) “such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.”18 
Interestingly, Dodd-Frank does not define deceptive practices.19  
However, the CFPB has published examples of deceptive behavior.20  In 
addition, the CFPB has litigated cases against financial institutions for 
solely deceptive behavior.21  In these cases, courts ignore the lack of a 
statutory definition and rely on a common law definition of deception.22  
 
Under Richard Cordray: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Financial Services, and 
Bailouts of Public and Private Programs Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government 
Reform, 112th Cong.1, 2 (2012) [hereinafter Cordray Statement] (statement of Richard 
Cordray, Director of the CFPB) (referencing prior CFPB officials’ inability to answer the 
“simple question about the definition of abusive”). 
 17. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d). 
 18. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c). 
 19. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531. 
 20. Published examples of deceptive behavior include inadequate disclosure of material 
lease terms in television advertising and misrepresentation about loan terms, such as 
characterizing adjustable rate mortgages as fixed rate mortgages.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, CFPB LAWS AND REGULATIONS, UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR 
PRACTICES 1, 7 (2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
102012_cfpb_unfair-deceptive-abusive-acts-practices-udaaps_procedures.pdf [hereinafter 
“CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS”]. 
 21. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (ruling in 
favor of the CFPB’s allegation of deceptive practices by the defendant). 
 22. See id. at 1192–93 (citing a common law definition for “deceptive” in light of the 
absence of a statutory definition). 
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Case law establishes that an act or practice is deceptive if: “(1) there is a 
representation, omission, or practice that, (2) is likely to mislead 
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the 
representation, omission, or practice is material.”23 
B. “Abusive” Standard: History and Analysis 
Prior to Dodd-Frank’s enactment, the abusive standard was 
defended before Congress as an intentionally “flexible” standard, 
partially in response to harmful activities leading up to the subprime 
mortgage crisis.24  Additionally, a more flexible standard might have been 
implemented to avoid the “cost-benefit” considerations present in the 
unfair and deceptive standards.25 Instead of focusing on whether the 
consumer can reasonably avoid a service or product, the new standard 
broadens the inquiry to whether there was any exploitation of consumer 
biases.26  However, the statutory language for abusive behavior also 
appears to retain the consideration of whether the financial institution 
exploited consumers’ inability to protect themselves.27 
Aside from its exclusion of a cost-benefit component, it is 
difficult to distinguish the abusive standard from the unfairness 
standard.28  Based on the statutory language alone, the lines are blurred 
between the abusive standard’s “inability to protect themselves” 
requirement and the unfairness standard’s consideration of reasonable 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Hearing Before 
the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 40 (2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110hhrg37556/html/CHRG-110hhrg37556.htm (introducing the “more flexible” abusive 
standard as a possible method for increasing regulatory effectiveness in areas such as 
mortgage lending); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 172 (2010) (“Current law prohibits unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices.  The addition of ‘abusive’ will ensure that the Bureau is 
empowered to cover practices where providers unreasonably take advantage of consumers.”). 
 25. Unfair acts or practices are permissible if they are “outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to the consumer,” whereas abusive acts or practices are prohibited regardless of the 
benefit to consumers.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) § 1031, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c)–(d) (2016); see also Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. 
ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 904–06 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (ruling that the CFPB’s 
“abusive” standard is not unconstitutional for vagueness, because legislative intent shows it 
to be an intentionally “flexible standard” and the statute provides “at least the minimal level 
of clarity” demanded by the Constitution). 
 26. Corrigan, supra note 16, at 128–29. 
 27. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(2)(B). 
 28. See Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c)–(d) (including both a consideration of 
avoidability and reasonableness in the definitions of unfair and abusive). 
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avoidance.29  As discussed later, these standards will become even more 
unclear upon application.30  Ultimately, neither the statute nor the CFPB 
provide much clarity on how to recognize risks a given consumer can 
identify, what exactly constitutes material interference with consumer 
understanding, or when a covered institution has taken “unreasonable” 
advantage of consumer bias, as opposed to simply engaging in a shrewd 
business transaction.31  While case law may solve these issues over time, 
there are only two instances of abuse allegations being brought apart from 
a claim of either deception or unfairness.32  There is a high level of 
uncertainty surrounding the legal issues at hand, and banks and financial 
institutions cannot afford to wait years for judicial opinions and 
administrative proceedings to unfold in order to understand the extent of 
a given regulatory scheme.33  
C. “Abusive” Standard: Criticism and Support  
When questioned before Congress regarding the vague nature of 
the new abusive standard, former CFPB Director Richard Cordray stated, 
“[W]e have determined that [the definition of ‘abusive’] is going to have 
to be a fact and circumstances issue; it is not something we are likely to 
be able to define in the abstract.  Probably not useful to try to define a 
term like that in the abstract.”34  His answer is reminiscent of Justice 
Stewart’s statement on obscenity: “I know it when I see it.”35  In regards 
to whether the term actually represents a distinct legal standard, the CFPB 
continues to claim that, although there may be overlap between standards 
with respect to certain conduct, the abusive standard represents a distinct 
 
 29. See id. (utilizing similar concepts of reasonable avoidance and the inability to self-
protect). 
 30. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 31. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531; see also Cordray Statement, supra note 16, at 
69 (quoting former CFPB Director Richard Cordray as saying “we are going to have to see 
what kind of situations may arise where that would seem to fit the bill,” with respect to the 
new abusive standard); CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 20, at 9. 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See Tobie Stanger, Why the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is in Danger, 
CONSUMER REPORTS (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-financial-
protection-bureau/why-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-is-in-danger/ (describing 
complaints of the high costs to financial institutions resulting from CFPB regulation). 
 34. Cordray Statement, supra note 16, at 69. 
 35. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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legal standard.36  However, while the CFPB has put forth specific 
examples of unfair and deceptive practices, it has yet to provide a clear 
example of abusive conduct.37  In light of the events leading up to the 
subprime mortgage crisis, some view the new standard as a necessary 
measure in order to help promote vigilance and financial stability.38  
However, even supporters of the new standard concede that such a 
malleable standard provides the CFPB with an extraordinary amount of 
power.39 
While there may be benefits to greater regulatory oversight, there 
are also risks associated with vague and arbitrary legal standards, and this 
is even more pronounced in the highly regulated consumer finance 
industry.40  One factor that has fueled uncertainty surrounding the new 
standard is the CFPB’s tendency to allege two or more standards for the 
same act or practice, thus blurring any lines of distinction between the 
terms.41  As expected, it is not uncommon for defendants to challenge the 
abusive standard.42  However, thus far courts have either embraced 
Congress’ intentional ambiguity,43 or avoided discussion of any 
 
 36. See generally CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 20 (setting 
forth the three UDAAP standards as separate and distinct, but providing no examples of the 
abusive standard). 
 37. See generally CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 20 (providing 
explicit examples of unfair and deceptive practices, but failing to provide any examples of 
abusive practices). 
 38. Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial 
Protection Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 119 (2011) (arguing 
that “abusive” was incorporated in response to the subprime mortgage crisis, and that the term 
was necessary to “restore financial stability and confidence in our financial markets” at the 
time it was passed). 
 39. See Eric M. Aberg, The Case for UDAAP-Based Credit Card Lending Regulations: 
Providing Greater Financial Security for America and American Consumers, 84 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1029, 1065–66 (2016) (conceding that there may be overlap between “abusive” and 
the other two standards, but arguing that the abusiveness prohibition is necessary to prevent 
actions which might otherwise conform with regulatory requirements, but pass “harmful costs 
onto consumers”). 
 40. Robert E. Bostram et al., Implications of the CFPB’s First Annual Report Regarding 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 129 BANKING L.J. 529, 534–35 (2012) (emphasizing 
the potential risks associated with the lack of legal precedence for the standards of what 
constitutes “abusive” conduct). 
 41. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. NDG Fin. Corp., No. 15-CV-5211 (CM), 2016 
WL 7188792 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (describing the defendants’ allegedly unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive debt collection practices). 
 42. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 
1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (ruling in favor of the CFPB’s allegations of unfair, deceptive, and 
abusive practices, and denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the “abusive” allegation). 
 43. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 878 (S.D. 
Ind. 2015). 
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unnecessary legal standards completely.44  In one case, the court declined 
to discuss the defendant’s objections to the vagueness of the abusive 
standard, because the CFPB had already satisfied the burden for 
deceptive conduct, which was sufficient.45 
Currently, there is no CFPB rule defining the abusive authority 
beyond the vague statutory language, nor is there any such rule under 
development.46  This is particularly perplexing considering the outcry 
from the private sector to provide further clarity.47  For example, the 
Senior Vice President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged former 
CFPB Director Richard Cordray to provide a more explicit definition of 
abusive behavior as early as 2012.48  One of the foremost criticisms of 
the CFPB as an agency has been its “regulation by enforcement” 
approach, as opposed to rule-based regulation.49  The outcry has started 
to result in pushback, and challenges to CFPB enforcement actions have 
risen substantially when compared to the first several years of the 
agency’s existence.50  Also, recent legislative action suggests that 
dissatisfaction with the agency might be gaining political traction.51  
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Treasury has published criticism of 
 
 44. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 
WL 4820635 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (ruling that, since the defendant engaged in deceptive 
conduct, there was no need to consider whether the behavior was unfair or abusive). 
 45. Id. 
 46. CONSUMER FIN PROT. BUREAU FINAL RULES, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
policy-compliance/rulemaking/final-rules (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU RULES UNDER DEVELOPMENT, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-
compliance/rulemaking/rules-under-development (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 47. Infra notes 48–49. 
 48. Rob Blackwell, U.S. Chamber Pressures CFPB to Define “Abusive”, AM. BANKER, 
July 3, 2012 (describing a letter from the president and chief executive of the U.S. Chamber’s 
Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness to Richard Cordray, reminding him of the 
CFPB’s responsibility to avoid “disparate standards” of law). 
 49. See JOSEPH L. BARLOON & ANAND S. RAMAN, CFPB DEFINES ‘UNFAIR,’ ‘DECEPTIVE’ 
AND ‘ABUSIVE’ PRACTICES THROUGH ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY, SKADDEN’S 2015 INSIGHTS - 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/201 
5/01/cfpb-defines-unfair-deceptive-and-abusive-practice (describing the language of the 
UDAAP provision as “broad and vague,” which facilitates the enforcement-based regulation 
strategy). 
 50. See Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law 
Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1097 (2016) (“[I]t is an empirically 
demonstrable fact that in its first 5 years, the Bureau was able to reach a negotiated settlement 
agreement with every bank subject to a public enforcement action.”). 
 51. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (seeking to limit 
the CFPB’s UDAAP authority); see also H.R.J. 111, 115th Cong. (2017) (repealing the 
CFPB’s Arbitration Agreements Rule); see also 12 C.F.R. Part 1040 (2017) (setting forth the 
CFPB’s now-repealed Arbitration Agreements Rule). 
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the CFPB’s enforcement tactics.52  However, in the midst of growing 
confusion and uncertainty, two recent CFPB actions might suggest the 
agency is attempting to provide much-needed clarity to the term. 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Aequitas 
The CFPB brought suit against Aequitas Capital Management, 
Inc. (“Aequitas”) on August 17, 2017, representing the first-ever CFPB 
UDAAP action brought solely on allegations of abusive acts or 
practices.53  Specifically, the CFPB alleged that Aequitas financed and 
provided a private student loan program in order to allow Corinthian 
Colleges, Inc. (“Corinthian”) to feign compliance with federal law.54  In 
order for a for-profit school to gain access to Title IV funds, federal law 
requires that at least 10% of revenue come from sources other than federal 
student aid (commonly referred to as the “90/10 Rule”).55  However, 
Corinthian derived more than 90% of its revenue from federal student 
loans.56  In order to appear as if it were in compliance with this 
requirement, Corinthian artificially inflated its tuition costs to exceed the 
federal aid maximum, and convinced Aequitas to offer students high-
interest tuition loans.57  Aequitas carried out this scheme, knowing there 
was a high probability of default and that the 10% threshold would not 
 
 52. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS: REPORT TO PRESIDENT 
DONALD J. TRUMP 82 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Documents/A%20Financial%20System.pdf (“In practice, the CFPB has avoided notice-and-
comment rulemaking and instead relied to an unusual degree on enforcement actions and 
guidance documents, which the CFPB has consistently issued without opportunity for public 
comment, to announce new standards of conduct.”). 
 53. Complaint of Plaintiff, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Aequitas Capital Mgmt., Inc. 
(2017) (No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited Jan. 
24, 2017). 
 54. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Aequitas Capital Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO 
1, 2 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 2017). 
 55. Id. at 3.  “Title IV funds” refers to federally subsidized loans, grants, and work study 
programs that make is more affordable for students to attend qualified schools (Pell Grant, 
Federal Perkins Loan, etc.).  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 90/10 Revenue Test, at 2-55 
(Apr. 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/training/fundamentals/common/files/10 
11FSAHbkVol2Master_60-62.pdf (describing Title IV Funds insofar as they relate to the 90/
10 institutional requirement). 
 56. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 3. 
 57. Id. at 3–4. 
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be reached.58  This failure occurred because Corinthian was required by 
law to buy back defaulted loans from the defendants, which would negate 
any revenue originally gained in the initial transaction.59  Students were 
not aware of the “scheme” behind the loans, and they lacked sufficient 
knowledge of the inflated tuition.60  Additionally, because they lacked 
alternative loan options to pay for the inflated tuition, the CFPB 
determined that the students could not adequately protect themselves.61  
In the only charge brought against the defendants, the CFPB alleged that 
this funding scheme and support of the loan program constituted an 
abusive act.62 
The CFPB alleged that Aequitas took “unreasonable advantage 
of a lack of understanding” by the student consumers, “the inability of 
the consumer[s] to protect the[ir own] interests” in selecting the loan, and 
“the reasonable reliance by the consumer[s]” that the school and its loan 
providers would “act in the interests of the consumer[s]” on at least a 
general level—i.e., not create and support an artificially-inflated tuition.63  
According to the CFPB, this type of predatory and dishonest lending 
scheme constituted an abusive act under Dodd-Frank.64  The behavior 
was deemed to satisfy the definition of “abusive” under the statute, and 
thus there appears to be no issue with the application of the CFPB’s new 
standard.65  Instead, the remaining issue is whether this type of behavior 
must necessarily be brought under the abusive standard, or whether the 
CFPB could just as easily categorize it as unfair. 
B. Zero Parallel 
Only six days after the filing of Aequitas, the CFPB brought 
another enforcement action alleging abusive behavior by Zero Parallel, 
LLC (“Zero Parallel”).66  Zero Parallel is a company that receives leads 
involving consumers seeking payday or installment loans, and then sells 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 3–4. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 9–11. 
 62. Id. at 26. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 26. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Zero Parallel, LLC, 2017 CFPB 0017 1 (Sept. 9, 2017). 
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those leads to lenders and re-marketing companies.67  The more a lender 
is willing to pay Zero Parallel, the more likely they are to receive a lead.68  
Although Zero Parallel is not a lender, it is still a “covered person” under 
Dodd-Frank because it provides a service to covered lenders, and thus 
falls under the CFPB’s regulatory authority.69  Among the lenders to 
whom Zero Parallel actively sold leads were a number of small-dollar or 
installment lenders that offer consumer loans for personal, family, or 
household purposes.70  After being connected with the borrower through 
Zero Parallel’s website, the lenders collected the principal loan amount, 
as well as interest and fees, directly from the consumer.71   
A number of states have laws that limit both the type of institution 
that may engage in this type of payday lending, as well as the amount of 
collectable interest.72  If a loan is found to violate these restrictions, 
certain states will deem the entire loan to be void and uncollectable.73  
With full knowledge that certain loans would be partially or wholly void 
under state law, Zero Parallel repeatedly sold consumer leads to lenders.74  
Citing the statutory definition of abusiveness under Dodd-Frank, the 
CFPB alleged that Zero Parallel engaged in abusive acts and practices.75  
According to the CFPB, this standard was satisfied because Zero Parallel 
“took unreasonable advantage of a lack of understanding on the part of 
the consumer of the material risks, costs, and conditions of the loans.”76 
Zero Parallel represented an unusual proceeding in that the harm 
alleged was both to consumers subject to interest rates above the legal 
limit, and to lenders who could not collect defaulted loans in such states.77  
However, the scope of this Note is limited solely to the harm to 
 
 67. Zero Parallel sold leads in all states requested by the purchaser except for New York, 
West Virginia, Arkansas, and Vermont.  Id. at 4. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. Id. at 1, 4; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) § 1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2016) (defining a “covered person” as: “(A) 
any person that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service; and 
(B) any affiliate of a person described in subparagraph (A) if such affiliate acts as a service 
provider to such person.”). 
 70. Zero Parallel, 2017 CFPB 0017 at 4. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 5. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Zero Parallel, LLC, 2017 CFPB 0017 1, 6 (Sept. 9, 2017) 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1–5. 
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consumers.  According to the CFPB, Zero Parallel took unreasonable 
advantage of the customer’s lack of understanding of relevant state law 
surrounding interest rates and valid lenders.78  It was further alleged that 
Zero Parallel took advantage of the expectation by the consumer that Zero 
Parallel would not allow them to be connected with a loan that was legally 
void.79  However, as in Aequitas, the key issue was not whether the broad 
definition of abuse was satisfied, but whether the standard of unfairness 
could have been just as easily met. 
IV.  COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 
A. Aequitas and Navient: A Comparison 
A recent case highlights a serious flaw in the CFPB’s “abuse” 
allegations in Aequitas.  In CFPB v. Navient Corp,80 the CFPB made 
allegations of abusive behavior by defendant Navient (formerly Sallie 
Mae).81  Specifically, the CFPB alleged that students relied on Navient to 
act in their best interest, and that Navient took advantage of that 
reliance.82  Navient allegedly engaged in abusive acts and practices by 
“steering” students into forbearance when it was not financially 
beneficial to the students.83  It did so simply because forbearance plans 
were less expensive and more convenient to administer than other 
repayment options.84  In addition to the abuse claim, the CFPB alleged 
 
 78. Id. at 6. 
 79. Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2016) (defining abusive behavior, in part, as that which 
takes advantage of a consumer’s reasonable reliance on the covered entity to act in his or her 
best interest). 
 80. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 
1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017). 
 81. Id. at 1–2. 
 82. Id. at 2–3. 
 83. Forbearance plans impose high costs on the borrower, and are typically intended only 
for those experiencing short-term financial difficulty.  For those experiencing long-term 
financial difficulties, an income-based repayment plan is generally more beneficial.  
However, Navient advised student borrowers experiencing long-term financial difficulty to 
enter into costly forbearance programs, eventually resulting in higher monthly payments and 
a greater principal loan amount.  Behavior like this “steering” prompted the CFPB to bring 
action against the lender.  Id. 
 84. Id. 
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that these “steering” practices were both unavoidable and harmful, and 
thus also satisfied the “unfair” standard.85  
The fact pattern of Navient bears a striking resemblance to that of 
Aequitas.  Both cases involved lending to students that was beneficial to 
the defendant at the expense of the consumer, and in both cases the 
student borrowers materially relied on information provide by the 
defendant to their detriment.86  However, in the Aequitas case involving 
the scheme to inflate tuition, the CFPB relied on only the “abuse” 
allegation.87  On the other hand, in the Navient “steering” case, the CFPB 
relied on both the abusive and unfairness standards.88  Upon close 
analysis, that key difference is difficult to reconcile.  In Navient, the only 
difference between the “abusive” and “unfair” allegations was the 
consideration of whether the benefits to students outweighed the harm 
(under the unfairness standard).89  The benefits to students in that case 
did not outweigh the harm, and the standard for unfairness was clearly 
met.90  Accordingly, it is unclear why allegations of unfairness were not 
brought in Aequitas as they were in Navient.91 
Applying the statutory definition of unfairness to the facts of 
Aequitas, the act or practice was likely to cause substantial financial 
injury to consumers that was not reasonably avoidable by consumers, as 
the students had no way to know of the unlawful scheme existing between 
Corinthian and Aequitas.92  In addition, countervailing benefits certainly 
did not outweigh the injury to students.93  In fact, students could not 
possibly benefit from a scheme where their tuition was raised and high-
interest loans were implemented to profit from their inability to pay the 
 
 85. Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 at 51–52. 
 86. Id.; see Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Aequitas Capital Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
01278-MO 1, 2 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 2017) (“[S]tudents had no way of knowing was only for a 
sham tuition charge solely to gain access to Title IV funds.”). 
 87. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 26. 
 88. Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101 at 50–51. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 at 50–51; Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (2016). 
 91. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at  2; Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 
3380530 at  50–51. 
 92. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at  9–11 (“[S]tudents had no way of knowing was 
only for a sham tuition charge solely to gain access to Title IV funds.”). 
 93. Id. 
   
2018] CFPB’S ABUSIVE STANDARD 203 
higher rate.94  In addition, Navient preceded Aequitas, and thus would 
have supported the application of the unfairness standard to student loan 
practices.95  
Given the striking similarity of fact patterns between the two 
cases and the clear satisfaction of the statutory language, the CFPB could 
have just as easily relied on an allegation of unfairness in the Aequitas 
case.96  That fact does not bode well for the doubters of the CFPB’s new 
standard of abuse under Dodd-Frank.  Relying solely on analysis of 
Aequitas, the abusive standard is not necessary.97  As far as Aequitas is 
concerned, the CFPB is more than properly equipped with only the 
unfairness and deception standards inherited from the FTC.98  In addition, 
the unfairness and deception standards have decades of case law 
supporting them, whereas the “abusive” standard on its own is supported 
by just two cases.99  
B. Zero Parallel and Flurish: A Comparison  
In another payday loan action preceding the Zero Parallel case, 
the CFPB brought an action against Flurish, Inc (“Flurish”).100  Among 
other allegations, the CFPB alleged that Flurish engaged in unfair acts 
and practices by charging borrowers fees which they were completely 
unaware of prior to default.101  Applying the unfairness standard, the 
CFPB concluded that these undisclosed fees were likely to cause 
substantial harm to borrowers that could not be reasonably avoided, and 
that the countervailing benefits provided to the consumer did not 
outweigh this harm.102 
Once again, the two cases present a similar fact pattern.  Both 
cases involve a “covered person” that knowingly facilitated lending 
 
 94. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 9–11; Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101 at 50–51; 
Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)–(d). 
 95. Navient was filed in January, 2017, and Aequitas was filed in August, 2017. Navient, 
No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 at 1; Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 1. 
 96. Id.; Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)–(d). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Supra Part III. 
 100. Flurish, Inc., d/b/a LendUp, 2016-CFPB-0023 1 (Sept. 27, 2016) (consent order). 
 101. Id. at 9. 
 102. Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) 
§ 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (2016). 
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practices where consumers were unaware of a latent financial risk at the 
time they entered into the loan agreement.103  Comparison of the cases 
begs the question: Why was unfairness not alleged against Zero Parallel, 
as it was against Flurish?  Applying the statutory unfairness standard, 
Zero Parallel engaged in an act or practice that was likely to cause 
substantial injury to borrowers, as its actions resulted in or were likely to 
result in higher interest rates and legally void loans.104  Also, the injury 
was not reasonably avoidable by consumers, as it would be unreasonable 
to assume consumers are aware of state law with respect to loan interest 
caps and who constitutes a valid lender.105  In addition, considering the 
CFPB described Zero Parallel’s behavior as taking unreasonable 
advantage of consumers, it is unlikely that the agency would allege that 
the injuries were outweighed by countervailing consumer benefits.106  
Given the similar fact patterns between the cases and the straightforward 
application of the statutory language, it is likely that the CFPB could have 
brought a successful unfairness claim against Zero Parallel.107  Moreover, 
the action against Flurish would have provided precedent for such a 
claim.108 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by analysis of the only two stand-alone abuse 
cases, the abusive and unfairness standards are interchangeable, and the 
CFPB’s future use of the new standard remains unclear.109  As it currently 
stands, there is no persuasive reason for retaining the “abusive” 
standard.110  Even for purposes of imposing penalties, the standard serves 
 
 103. See generally Zero Parallel, LLC, 2017 CFPB 0017 1 (Sept. 9, 2017) (describing Zero 
Parallel’s actions as taking unreasonable advantage of the consumers’ lack of understanding); 
see generally Flurish, 2016-CFPB-0023 1 (describing Flurish’s actions as being likely to 
mislead consumers, and finding that Flurish did not provide consumers with all of the relevant 
information). 
 104. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c); Flurish, 2016-CFPB-0023 at 9. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c); Flurish, 2016-CFPB-0023 at 9 (Sept. 27, 
2016) (consent order); see also Zero Parallel, 2017 CFPB 0017 at 6 (alleging abusive 
behavior wherein the defendant “took unreasonable advantage” of the consumer’s lack of 
understanding). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Supra Parts III–IV. 
 110. Supra Parts III–IV. 
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no apparent purpose.111  While the CFPB can impose a penalty of up to 
$1 million for every day that a financial institution knowingly violates 
federal consumer financial law, there is no statutory language to suggest 
that a financial entity charged with unfairness and abuse would receive 
harsher sanctions than an entity charged with unfairness alone.112  
Ultimately, the standard appears to generate a great deal of criticism and 
confusion without any apparent benefit to the CFPB or to consumers.113 
While it is possible this ambiguity could lead to confusion and 
harm to financial institutions, several considerations might limit the 
impact of such an effect.  Initially, Aequitas and Zero Parallel involve 
financial activities that are extremely controversial and politically 
relevant.114  Payday lending and student borrowing abuse are highly 
contentious and hotly debated issues.115  Consequently, by limiting its 
application of the abusive standards to these issues, the CFPB is able to 
further its policy initiatives in these developing areas of law.116  The 
widespread support for further regulation of these controversial financial 
activities is likely to minimize any negative connotations surrounding the 
use of the vague abusive standard.117  In addition, such enforcement 
actions largely avoid stepping on the toes of the largest financial 
institutions, who might be more prone to challenge allegations of 
 
 111. There is no statutory indication of a higher penalty for financial institutions violating 
multiple UDAAP standards, as opposed to just one standard.  See Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 
U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2)(C) (allowing a maximum penalty of $1 million per day as long as the 
violation of CFPB law continues). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See supra Section II.C; see also supra Parts III–IV. 
 114. Lisa Servon, Are Payday Loans Harmful to Consumers?, 36 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 240, 240 (2017) (describing payday loans as “perhaps the most hotly debated” 
consumer finance topic today); see also Laurie A. Lucas & Christopher L. Peterson, 
Developments in Federal Student-Lending Law: Harbingers of Change?, 72 BUS. LAW. 465, 
465 (describing the growing popular discontentment with the student loan system). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
47864 (July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041 (2016)) (setting forth the finalized 
law surrounding payday lending, and categorizing certain payday lending activities as unfair 
and abusive); see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB 
STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN: STRATEGIES FOR CONSUMER-DRIVEN REFORM 2–3 (2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_annual-
report_student-loan-ombudsman_2017.pdf (describing the CFPB’s expansive regulation of 
student loans, with the agency handling over 50,700 student loan complaints between 2011 
and 2017, and returning $750 million to student borrowers). 
 117. Servon, supra note 114; Lucas & Peterson, supra note 114. 
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abuse.118  Historically, banks have been reluctant to contest any CFPB 
action, but a stand-alone abuse allegation might present an opportunity.119 
As one Supreme Court opinion so accurately stated, “[b]anking 
is one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of public 
callings.”120  As a result, clarity and precision of law in the area of finance 
are extremely important.121  Consequently, such a blatant fluidity of legal 
standards is extremely worrisome for several reasons.  First, financial 
institutions strive to be creatures of efficiency, and the CFPB should seek 
to minimize the gray area of law as much as possible by removing 
intentional ambiguity in order to increase oversight.122  Second, in light 
of recent criticism of the CFPB and talk of “defanging” the agency, the 
CFPB should clearly convey its benefits and standards of enforcement to 
the public.123  
A recently-proposed House Appropriations bill includes 
provisions for the overhauling of the CFPB.124  If passed, this bill would 
substantially limit the agency’s regulatory authority, strip the agency of 
its UDAAP authority, and restrict its regulatory authority over payday 
and vehicle-title loans.125  One U.S. Senator described the bill as an 
attempt to “reign in the rogue” CFPB.126  While such a characterization 
of the CFPB may not be completely accurate, it speaks to how the agency 
 
 118. See Nick Bourke, How OCC Can Help Banks Disrupt the Payday Loan Industry, AM. 
BANKER (May 23, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/how-occ-can-help-
banks-disrupt-the-payday-loan-industry (describing how federal regulation has driven small-
loan borrowers from banks, forcing consumers to turn to riskier loans from institutions such 
as payday lenders). 
 119. Peterson, supra note 50, at 1097 (highlighting the glaring lack of challenges to CFPB 
enforcement actions by banks). 
 120. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947). 
 121. See Bostram et al., supra note 40, at 534–35 (“Careful vigilance and monitoring will 
be required to ensure that the CFPB’s FDCPA supervisory efforts do not result in costly and 
unnecessary burdens for participants in the debt collection market.”). 
 122. See Bostram et al., supra note 40, at 534–35 (arguing that the ambiguity surrounding 
the application of the “abusive” standard could lead to the arbitrary punishment of previously 
lawful activities). 
 123. See Rob Tricchinelli, Volcker Rule Repeal Included in Draft House Spending Bill, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 28, 2017), https://www.bna.com/volcker-rule-repeal-n73014460949 
(describing a recent appropriations bill’s proposal “gut” the CFPB of its primary regulatory 
authorities as they currently exist); see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th 
Cong. (2017) (seeking to strike the UDAAP authority from current law). 
 124. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 125. Tricchinelli, supra note 123; see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th 
Cong. (2017). 
 126. Tricchinelli, supra note 123; see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th 
Cong. (2017). 
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is viewed by people who are seeking to limit the agency’s power.127  If 
the perplexing application of its abusive standard is any indication, 
perhaps reservations with the CFPB’s regulatory authority are not 
entirely unfounded.128 
The future of the abusive standard is just as unclear as its current 
implementation.  Will the CFPB continue to primarily use the term in 
conjunction with the other standards, or do Aequitas and Zero Parallel 
mark the beginning of a new era for the standard?  Will the CFPB provide 
a distinct purpose and definition for the term—something its director was 
previously unwilling to do129—or will the agency cease application of the 
standard entirely?  Unfortunately for “covered” financial entities, these 
answers remain unclear.  However, the CFPB should not continue to view 
this ambiguity and broad oversight as a benefit to its authority.130  The 
future of the agency is uncertain, and at least one chamber of Congress 
has shown itself willing to act in order to restrict its authority.131  In 
addition, there is speculation that the change in CFPB leadership could 
result in a less proactive agency.132  If the agency adopts a less aggressive 
approach to regulation, this might temporarily alleviate worries with 
 
 127. Tricchinelli, supra note 123; see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th 
Cong. (2017). 
 128. Supra Parts III–IV. 
 129. Cordray Statement, supra note 16, at 69 (“[W]e have determined that [the definition 
of ‘abusive’] is going to have to be a fact and circumstances issue; it is not something we are 
likely to be able to define in the abstract.  Probably not useful to try to define a term like that 
in the abstract.”).  An interesting concept, scholar Patrick M. Corrigan proposes that Congress 
adopt a theory of “abusive” conduct which places the burden on financial institutions to show 
a valid efficiency or business-related rationale for allegedly abusive behavior (other than 
simply exploiting consumer bias).  Corrigan, supra note 16, at 156–57. 
 130. Given that accusations of “rogue” or arbitrary behavior by the CFPB have played a 
role in furthering legislation against the agency, more defined and narrow authority might 
alleviate said concerns.  See generally Tricchinelli, supra note 123 (quoting one congressman 
and a proponent of the Financial Choice Act as saying the bill was designed to “reign in the 
rogue” CFPB). 
 131. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017); Yuka Hayashi, CFPB 
Head Cordray to Step Down, Paving Way for Change at Watchdog, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 
2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-director-richard-cordray-to-step-down-151076661 
7; see also Am. Bankers Ass’n, Industry Defeats Arbitration Rule, 110 AM. BANKERS ASS’N 
J. 14, 14 (Jan. 2018) (describing the repeal of the CFPB’s ban on mandatory arbitration clauses 
as a “victory” for bankers). 
 132. Kate Berry, CFPB 2018 Outlook: More Deregulation, More Upheaval, AM. BANKER, 
Jan. 3, 2018, https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-2018-outlook-more-deregulation-
more-upheaval (describing acting CFPB Director Mick Mulvaney’s change to the agency’s 
mission statement, adding that the agency will now pinpoint and address “outdated, 
unnecessary or unduly burdensome regulations.”). 
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respect to UDAAP overreach.133  However, while the evolution of the 
abusive standard might halt for the foreseeable future, there is always the 
danger of its resurrection by a future administration.  Ultimately, the 
CFPB only stands to benefit from bringing further clarity, precision, and 
stability to its legal standards.134 
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